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TBE ABSTENTION PRINCIPLE AND ITS RELATION TO
THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEAS
SOJR YAMAMOTO-
INTRODUCTION
The problem of control and regulation of ocean resources was one of
the most difficult problems Japan faced on her return to international
society after the Second World War. This problem graphically illus-
trated the Japanese position in international society. For Japan was
not only in the position of an advanced fishing nation; she was also
faced with a general tendency which worked against her prewar fishing
operation. Japan had to protect her fisheries while a postwar "progres-
sive" movement in the international law of the seas with restraint as its
means and conservation as its goal, tended to create a new balance in
the international fishery.
This modification of the concept of ocean fisheries right operates as
a fetter on the Japanese fishermen who have been excluded from cer-
tain world ocean fisheries year after year. Thus, it is quite natural for
Japanese fishermen to favor maintenance of the traditional doctrine of
freedom of access to the ocean fisheries and free competition in fishing
operations. However, neither the author nor the Japanese Government
is necessarily in favor of such a passionate and unrealistic view.
In 1952 Japan concluded the International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean1 [hereinafter cited as Tri-
partite Treaty] with the United States and Canada, thereby subjecting
her fishing activities in the North Pacific Ocean to regulation. The
treaty embodied the principle of abstention whereby Japan was ex-
cluded from fishing on the high seas for certain stocks of fish.2 Al-
* Professor of International Law, Seikei University (Tokyo).
May 9, 1952, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786.
"In § I of the annex of the convention, Japan agreed to abstain from fishing:
(1) Halibut
off the coasts of Canada and the United States ... in which commercial fishing for
halibut is being or can be prosecuted. Halibut referred to herein shall be those
originating along the coasts of North America;
(2) Herring
off the coasts of Canada and United States .... exclusive of the Bering Sea and
of the waters of the North Pacific Ocean west of the meridian passing through the
extremity of the Alaskan Peninsula, in which commercial fishing for herring of
North American origin is being or can be prosecuted;
(3) Salmon
off the coasts of Canada and the United States .... exclusive of the Bering Sea and
of the waters of the North Pacific Ocean west of a provisional line following the
meridian passing through the western extremity of Atka Island; in which com-
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though Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty, she has never fully ac-
cepted the abstention principle as a legitimate doctrine of international
law. As a developed fishing nation engaged in extensive high seas
exploitation, Japan necessarily opposes any principle which restricts
her high seas fishing operations. Traditionally, Japan has subscribed
to the doctrine of free exploitation of ocean resources, but today she
recognizes the need for certain controls in the interest of conservation.
The abstention principle, however, does not embody the types of con-
trols to which Japan would ascribe.
The Tripartite Treaty may be terminated at any time; provisions
in the convention provide for unilateral termination by any of the
parties after ten years from the effective date of the treaty.3 In view of
present efforts to renegotiate the treaty and the possibility of termina-
tion, it is very important to determine the present legal status of the
abstention principle which the United States may continue to support
and which Japan will most certainly continue to oppose.
It should be our task to objectively determine whether the abstention
principle embodied in the Tripartite Treaty rationalizes the conserva-
tion of ocean resources in view of the historic development or trans-
mutation of the concept of fishery rights under the international law of
the seas. In order to do so, we must examine both the abstention
principle and the historical development of fishery rights. Ultimately,
this necessitates discussion of the consistency or lack thereof between
mercial fishing for salmon originating in the rivers of Canada and the United
States of America is being or can be prosecuted.
In § II of the annex, Japan and Canada agreed to abstain from fishing salmon in
The Convention area of the Bering Sea east of the line starting from the Cape
Prince of Wales on the west coast of Alaska, running westward to 168o58'22.59"
West Longitude; thence due south to a point 65015'00" North Latitude; thence
along the great circle course which passes through 510 North Latitude and 167'
East Longitude; thence south along a provisional line which follows this
meridian to the territorial waters limit of Atka Island; in which commercial
fishing for salmon originating in the rivers of the United States of America is
being or can be prosecuted.
In the protocol to the convention, it was made very clear that the provisional area of
abstention and conservation of salmon demarcated by the line of merdian long. 175"W.
and the line following the meridian passing through the western extremity of Atka
Island was only provisional and subject to readjustment. No change has been made
as yet.
Because of lack of a sufficient showing that halibut stocks were being fully
utilized, one of the necessary conditions for application of the abstention principle,
in 1962 Japan was given the right to fish halibut in portions of the East Bering Sea
theretofore closed to them.
Article XI(2) states that the convention:
shall continue in force for a period of ten years and thereafter until one year
from the day on which a Contracting Party shall give notice to the other
Contracting Parties of an intention of terminating the Convention, whereupon
it shall terminate as to all Contracting Parties.
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the Tripartite Treaty and the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas.4 The validity of the
abstention principle must be judged in two respects: (1) its legal
status in the Tripartite Treaty itself; and (2) its legal status judged
in the light of general principles of international law, past and present.
I. THE ABSTENTION PPINCIPLE AND THE TRIPARTITE TR EATY
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case5 of December 18, 1951, the
International Court of Justice ruled that at least the implied consent of
other nations was necessary before Norway could assert her "historic
title" to the disputed areas of water.' The concept of historic title in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case does not differ significantly from
the concepts of "past record" and "contiguity" embodied in the ab-
stention principle as articulated by the United States. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that the validity of the abstention principle de-
pends upon the extent to which other nations have acquiesced in that
principle. Japan's consent to the abstention principle might be as-
sumed because she entered into an agreement adopting that principle,
but her signing of the Tripartite Treaty does not automatically signify
acquiescence and thus legitimize the principle of abstention.
In the first place, Japan was obligated to enter into a treaty by
article 9 of the Peace Treaty signed by Japan in San Francisco on
September 8, 1951.1 Japan's status and independence as a sovereign
'Adopted by the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/L.54 (1958).
'Judgment of December 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. 116-206.
'The litigation was between Norway and Great Britain. Norway, by the Royal
Decree of July 12, 1935, delimited a fisheries zone for that part of Norway situated
north of lat. 66°28.8'N. The case concerned the validity under international law of
the lines of delimitation of the zone and the validity of the base lines of the marginal
sea drawn in such delimitation. The International Court of Justice ruled that the
Royal Decree did not constitute a violation of international law and that the lines
of delimitation, using the straight lines method of delimitation, were valid. While
one judge asserted that Norway had proved the existence of historic title to the
disputed areas of water, the majority disagreed. The Court ruled that at least the
implied consent of other nations was necessary before Norway could assert historic
title. However, the Court presumed that Norway had exercised an exclusive right
on the premise that the rule of international law itself was uncertain and changing.
Moreover, England had to bear the burden of proving the nonexistence of consent.
Thus, the decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case may be regarded as
proclaiming that access to a fishery based on the freedom of the high seas is a tradi-
tional non-exclusive right and different in nature from "historic title."
Article 9 provides that:
Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring
for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the
regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of
fisheries on the high seas.
25 DEP'T. STATE Bur.. No. 635, 350 (1951).
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nation at the time she entered into the Tripartite Treaty is at least
questionable. Although assurances were given by the United States
that Japan was a free and independent agent in the negotiations, the
fact is that at the time of the negotiations the United States had not
ratified the Peace Treaty with Japan,8 and allied forces still occupied
Japanese territory. Japan certainly was not coerced into signing the
Tripartite Treaty, but there were undoubtedly subtle pressures on
Japan to accept without great objection the suggestion of the victor.
In any event it is clear that the question of coercion cannot settle the
matter of consent one way or the other.
Instead of quibbling over the issue of whether or not Japan was a
free agent when she entered into the Tripartite Treaty, it would be
more useful to inquire into the understanding of the parties as to the
meaning of the agreement itself. In other words, did Japan agree to
the abstention principle as the United States presently articulates that
principle? It is possible that Japan signed the agreement without fully
understanding the meaning of abstention as used by the United States.
Such misunderstanding would not negate the legal effect of the treaty,
but the misunderstanding would certainly bear on the question of
consent which would give legitimacy to the concept of abstention in
later negotiations for a new treaty between the United States and
Japan.
In 1951 during the negotiation of the Tripartite Treaty a basic
difference in the United States and Japanese approaches to the fisheries
problem arose. The American draft of the treaty advocated that Japan
abstain from certain fishing operations in order to conserve ocean
resources that had been subject to conservation programs of Canada
and the United States in previous years.' In contrast, the Japanese
draft advocated as a principle of the treaty free access to the ocean
resources and free competition; Japan recognized the necessity of
regulation for the purpose of conserving ocean resources, but did not
recognize the principle of exclusion of one nation and not others. I°
' Negotiations for the Tripartite Treaty extended from November 4 to December
14, 1951; President Truman signed the Peace Treaty on April 15, 1952.
Abstention from fishing operations in order to conserve ocean resources under
certain conditions was regarded as the basic principle according to the American
draft. However, a departure from the general application of this principle was in-
cluded as an important "exception" as to specific nations with "past records."
'
0 Japan's premise was that freedom of access to ocean fisheries is the basic doc-
trine and that a conservation program is admitted as an exception only to the extent
necessary. Moreover, Japan believed that regulatory measures for conservation should
only establish rates or quotas of harvest and not prohibit fishing operations entirely.
See MfINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRIPARTITE FISHERIES CONFERENCE (Nov.-Dec.,
1951).
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The differences of opinions between Japan and the United States (and
Canada)" caused various- conflicts during the negotiation process. It
is possible that so much confusion arose during these negotiations that
there was no "meeting of the minds" on certain central matters in the
final agreement.
The original American draft provided exceptions to the application
of the principle of abstention as to (a) the fisheries contiguous to the
territorial sea of a state because of the fundamental interests of that
state with respect to her coastal area, and (b) the fisheries which each
state has, recently or at present, exploited and maintained on a sub-
stantial scale based on her economic and historic interests. The reasons
for this proviso can be explained in the following way: 2
Regulatory arrangements for a particular fishery can best be made by the
state whose continued use of, or relative proximity to, the affected
resources gives them both the interest and the intimate knowledge neces-
sary for wise and effective control. Control by those who best know and
understand the particular fishery is not only most likely to be well suited
to the needs of the fishery, but also to be governed by the practical corn-
non-sense idea that no regulations should be adopted unless adequate
reason for them can be shown.
Thus it would appear, at least when literally interpreted, that the
original American draft proposed exceptions to the application of the
abstention principle on two different grounds: one based on supremacy
of the coastal state and the other on "respect" for past records. In
the process of negotiation, however, the United States, agreed to give up
the notion of supremacy of the coastal state in view of Japan's strong
opposition. But, in my view, the United States did not in fact give up
the notion of supremacy of the coastal state because the supremacy
notion and the past record concept are interrelated.' 3 It would be
safe to conclude that, in spite of the alleged concession to the Japa-
" Canada's interests in the North Pacific are similar to those of the United States.
Not only did she support incorporation of the abstention principle into the Tri-
partite Treaty, but she also joined the United States in urging inclusion of the
principle in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas.
'Bishop, International Law Commission Draft on Fisheries, 50 Am. J. INT'L
L. 629 (1956). While Bishop was referring to the background within which the
1955 draft articles of the International Law Commission should be examined, this
American viewpoint would appear to be equally applicable within the context of the
Tripartite Treaty negotiations.
'These two ideas were not alternative means to accomplish the exclusion of
Japanese fishery but were seemingly proposed to achieve the goal in a strengthened
fashion. Either idea, embracing the other within it, could have reached the expected
result.
1967]
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nese request, the supremacy of the coastal state idea has been main-
tained in a restrictive form within the concept of "past record." Such
a conclusion can be supported by examining the concept of contiguous
as used in the original United States draft and as revealed in the
negotiation proceedings.
According to the American delegation the concept of contiguous
within the meaning of "any stock of fish which exists within the high
seas contiguous to the territorial sea," (the provision deleted by the
United States) (emphasis added) is entirely different from the usual
concept of contiguous used to describe the relationship between a
"neighboring sea" and a coastal line. Under the American view, all
areas are "contiguous" regardless of their distance from the coast so
long as stocks of fish are constantly discoverable from the coastline to
the "contiguous" areas. For example, even if a certain stock of fish is
discovered in the high seas far from the coastal line it would be a
contiguous stock if it is discoverable between the coastal area and the
high seas location.
Given the American definition of contiguous it is clear that the
concept of contiguous is wholly different from the idea of supremacy
of the coastal state based on its geographical proximity to the sea.
However, the definition seems to embody a kind of natural law idea
that the coastal state has a superior claim to ocean resources because of
its proximity to those resources.
Having arrived at this definition of contiguous, the American dele-
gation argued that the state contiguous to certain stocks of fish need
not abstain from fishing for those stocks; that is, the contiguous con-
cept should be considered independently of the three conditions 4 re-
quired for the application of the abstention principle under the Tri-
partite Treaty. Its concept of contiguous, in other words, would allow
"According to article IV(1) (b), before application of the abstention principle to
any stock of fish it must be shown that:
(i) Evidence based upon scientific research indicates that more intensive exploi-
tation of the stock will not provide a substantial increase in yield which can be
sustained year after year;
(ii) The exploitation of the stock is limited or otherwise regulated through legal
measures by each Party which is substantially engaged in its exploitation, for
the purpose of maintaining or increasing its maximum sustained productivity;
such limitations and regulations being in accordance with conservation pro-
grams based upon scientific research, and;
(iii) The stock is the subject of extensive scientific study designed to discover
whether the stock is being fully utilized and the conditions necessary for main-
taining its maximum sustained productivity.
It is noteworthy that scientific research is required in each condition.
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the United States to fish for salmon which are "contiguous" to her
coast, and, at the same time, require other nations to abstain. 5
The same result can be achieved by using the concept of past
record. 6 It is reasonable to assume that when a certain stock of fish
contiguous and past record are identical, particularly when applied to
exploitation by that state. In a functional sense, then, the concepts of
continguous and past record are identical, particularly when applied to
certain fisheries in the North Pacific.
Because the concept of contiguous is absorbed within the concept
of past record, the United States, in fact, did not accede to the request
of Japan to abandon the notion of supremacy of the coastal state.
The alleged "compromise" did not occur.' Did Japan appreciate this
fact or should she have appreciated it? If one answers this question
affirmatively, then he must conclude that Japan consented to the
principle of abstention embodied in the Tripartite Treaty of 1952. If,
however, Japan did not appreciate or could not have been expected to
appreciate the situation in view of the alleged compromise on the part
of the United States, then it cannot be said that Japan agreed to the
abstention principle. The question of consent in view of the historical
circumstances and the confusion generated in the actual negotiation is
at least debatable. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951 would
5 The motivation for such an argument by the United States delegation may be
inferred from the following considerations: (1) Unless a stock of fish meets the three
conditions of article IV (1) (b), there would be no reason to assert the supremacy of
coastal states based on the "contiguous" concept because the general application of
the principle of abstention cannot be attained in such a case; (2) On the other hand,
when the three conditions are met with respect to certain stocks of fish (e.g., in case of
full utilization or in case of existence of conservation regulations by any of the
concerned states), the coastal state would be excepted, based on the concept of "con-
tiguous," from the general application of the duty to abstain.
The proviso to article IV states inter alia:
[N]o recommendation shall be made for abstention by a Contracting Party con-
cerned with regard to: (1) any stock of fish which at any time during the
twenty-five years next preceding the entry into force of this Convention has
been under substantial exploitation by that Party having regard to the conditions
referred to in Section 2 of this Article; ....
As a result of the "compromise," the United States is in a strong position to
stabilize its present position. The "compromise" allows a coastal state long utilizing
conservation measures to apply those regulations to another nation as to those species
of fish found in the high seas "contiguous" to its territorial sea. More concretely
stated, the United States may claim the application of its conservation to Japanese
fishermen if the United States had theretofore imposed those regulations on her
fishermen in regard to the fishing operations in the high seas. Indeed, the United
States may exclude or prohibit other nations from certain high seas fisheries if her
own fishermen were so prohibited (but note that United States fishermen could be
allowed to operate within her territorial sea). Needless to say, the imposition of
such regulations by the United States would be subject to the consent of foreign
nations, but we cannot deny the strategically superior position possessed by the
United States at the beginning of the negotiation process.
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seem to indicate that the burden of proving the nonexistence of consent
rests with Japan. Japan would have a difficult time sustaining the
burden of proof in view of the fact that she entered into a treaty which
clearly embodies the principle of abstention and the concept of past
record, but the question of Japan's consent is certainly not clearcut;
the doubts surrounding the formulation of the abstention principle
certainly weaken the precedential value of the Tripartite Treaty as
establishing the validity of the abstention principle as a legitimate
doctrine of international law. It is now necessary to examine the
abstention principle in light of present and past precedential matter.
II. AN EVALUATION OF LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR THE ACCEPTABILITY
OF THE ABSTENTION PRINCIPLE AS A VALID DOCTRINE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The roots of the United States' argument for abstention can be
traced to earlier fishery controversies. The concept of the "territorial
sea" was a product of factors unrelated to fisheries interests. But
once the concept had come into existence, the exclusive character of
fisheries right was explained as an attribute of the sovereignty to
territorial seas. Thus, an expansion beyond territorial seas of a mo-
nopolized fisheries area necessarily required an expansion of territorial
seas themselves, and a nation in so doing had to prove the existence of
a "historic title"'" to justify such an expansion.
After the middle of the nineteenth century, however, such an inter-
national legal order of seas was challenged and endeavors were made to
explain exclusive fisheries right from a basis other than a territorial
theory. The first in this trend of events was the Bering Sea Fur Seal
Arbitration of 1893"s [hereinafter cited as Fur Seal Case], contested
between the United States and Great Britain, where we can observe a
germ of the "abstention" idea in the United States position.
In the Fur Seal Case, the United States asserted exclusive jurisdic-
"According to traditional theory, "historic title" is regarded as an exception
to the general rules of international law. Historic title is the legitimization of an
originally illegal act by the continuation of its practice for a long period of time.
1" See P. COBBETT, LEADING CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 128-29 (4th ed. 1922);
2 H. S2IITH, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 103 (1935).
' Between 1868 and 1871, the United States promulgated a series of domestic
regulatory statutes prohibiting capture of fur seals without license in the area
adjacent to Alaska. The license was conditioned as to time, quantity, and use of
weapons. From the beginning, the Departments of State and Treasury took the view
that the United States could enforce such regulations only within 3 miles with
respect to foreign fisheries. They asserted that foreign fisheries operated outside the
3-mile territorial limit were free from domestic regulations. See L. LEONARD,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FISHERIES 57 (1944). But after 1886, the United States
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tion over foreign sealing boats operating beyond the 3-mile territorial
limit on the basis of her alleged proprietary interest in the fur seals
and alleged right to protect the fur seal industry claimed to have been
purchased from Russia."
The main issues presented in the controversy were: (a) whether the
United States could exercise her exclusive jurisdiction over foreign
boats outside the 3-mile limit because of her alleged proprietary inter-
est in fur seals, and (b) whether the United States could seize Cana-
dian boats in the high seas because of the latter's "unethical" method
of catching fur seals. The United States did not assert territorial ex-
pansion or expansion of territorial jurisdiction; nor did she claim to
revive the idea of proprietary interest over the oceans, (mare clau-
sum), which was antithetical to the then current principle of free
access to the high seas. Rather, as noted previously, the United States
asserted an exclusive fisheries right allegedly superior to the then-
existing legal order of the high seas because of its conservation motive
and proprietary interest in fur seals. In the arbitration contest the
United States stated that, although fur seals were animals ferae na-
turae, they belonged to the United States. The reasons were stated as
follows: (a) fur seals make annual returns to the Pribilof Islands;
(b) hence, a proprietary interest lodges in the nation who can control
and exploit (without depletion) such animals and (c) which has in
past endeavors undertaken such exploitation and conservation.
Britain argued that property in animals jerae naturae was dependent
upon actual possession; she maintained that once the seals had de-
started to seize British boats about 60 miles from the coastal line claiming viola-
tions of domestic regulations, and United States courts cooperated by enforcing such
measures. See F. GREFFCKEN, LA QUESTION D'ALASKA, REVUE DE DRorr INTER-
NATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COmPARE- t. 23, 238-40 (1891). In negotiations between
the two nations from 1887 to 1891, the United States gave up after strong British
protest a de facto "closed sea" argument regarding the Bering Sea as well as the
assertion of a territorial sea limit of 100 miles, but tried to justify the regulations
by asserting proprietary interests in and a right to protect fur seals. At the same
time, the State Department urged that the seven concerned nations conclude an inter-
national treaty to regulate capture of fur seals in the Bering Sea, proposed establish-
ment of restrictive measures relating to prohibition of firing weapons, time of
harvest, and annual quotas, and emphasized, because of the recurring migratory nature
of fur seals, the impracticability of creation of an off-limits area covering the fifty miles
from the coast. Negotiations were broken off, however, because of Canadian opposition.
Continuous Canadian fishing operations in the area stiffened the United States attitude.
The controversy in the Fur Seal Case arose from a United States seizure of a British
(Canadian) boat outside the 3-mile territorial limit.
'The United States justified her assertion of exclusive jurisdiction by main-
taining that it was an emergency rule to conserve natural resources in which a huge
amount of money was invested; that the conservation claim was superior to normal
rules of the sea; and that the current migratory nature of fur seals established owner-
ship in the United States. See P. COBBETT, LEADING CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
128-29 (4th ed. 1922).
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parted from the islands into the high seas, they were no longer under
the proprietorship of the United States, and that the principle of free
fishing on the high seas was applicable. Britain responded to the
United States contention that conservation requirements dictated the
exclusion of foreign boats from broad areas of the high seas by alleging
that such exclusion violated the freedom of the high seas and that the
United States claim of necessity could not be recognized as an interna-
tional right unless express or implied consent had been given by the
nations concerned.
The tribunal adopted the British viewpoint. It was decided that the
United States had no proprietary interest nor a right to protect fur
seals in the Bering Sea so long as they were outside the 3-mile limit.
The exclusive exercise of fisheries right was limited to the territorial
sea with respect to the fur seals as well as to other ocean resources.
In rendering this opinion, however, the tribunal proposed certain con-
servation measures intended to bind both nations.22 The tribunal ad-
vised that both nations refrain from capturing fur seals within the 60-
mile area surrounding the Pribilof Islands, and that they determine a
certain period when capturing be allowed in the high seas outside the
prohibited area. The tribunal also recommended that the fishing opera-
tions be subject to licensing and that fishing equipment be subject to
restrictions. Both nations followed this advice by legislating certain
domestic regulatory rules.3 Thus, the advice of the tribunal recog-
nized the fisheries right of the noncoastal nation (i.e., Britain) to
operate outside the 60-mile limit off the Alaskan coast. And the tri-
bunal, in heeding the conservation requirements, equally allocated the
fisheries between the two nations. The tribunal at no time suggested
that one nation should abstain from fishing for the resource while the
other nation continue its historic exploitation. The Fur Seal Case is
certainly not authority for the principle of abstention.
Thus, the United States successfully obtained protection of fur seals
by the exclusion of noncoastal state operations on certain portions of
the high seas, but the excludable portion did not extend to the maxi-
mum possible excursion point of fur seals (being limited to a 60-mile
zone around the Pribilof Islands). Moreover, the United States was
not allowed to exploit furs in the excluded area. The concepts of
contiguous and past record were not present in the settlement of the
-The proposals were authorized by the Arbitration Agreement concluded on
February 29, 1892, between Britain and the United States.
'See P. JEssup, L'ExPLOITATION DES RICHESSES DE LA MER, RECUEIL DE COURS
t. 29, 419-20 (1929).
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fur seal dispute. Conservation was accomplished without creating
special rights in the coastal state.
In 1911 the Convention for the Preservation and Protection of Fur
Seals2 4 [hereinafter cited as Fur Seal Treaty] modified the traditional
method of equal restriction of fisheries rights in the high seas by en-
tirely prohibiting the capture of fur seals on the high seas and by im-
posing a duty upon a nation which had breeding lands to deliver cer-
tain portions of the harvest to other nations. Thus the treaty sought
to balance the economic interests of fursealing between coastal and
noncoastal nations.
It is clear that neither the Fur Seal Case nor the subsequent Fur
Seal Treaty recognized the principle of abstention as advocated by
the United States in the 1952 Tripartite Treaty. In 1937 and 1938
there were renewed efforts in the United States to exclude foreign
nations from fishing on the high seas where there were stocks of fish
important to the United States coastal fishermen. These efforts were
primarily directed at Japanese salmon fishing operations in the Alaska
area. The Copeland Bill25 purported to expand United States terri-
torial jurisdiction. Another bill26 claimed a proprietary interest in
salmon and asserted jurisdiction of the area where salmon traveled.
But these two proposals were regarded as legally defective and were
defeated. Some people suggested that Japan be allowed to participate
in fishing activities only if she undertook certain conservation meas-
ures, but this proposal was harshly criticized. For example, Senator
Schwellenbach said, "[t]his proposal would accomplish nothing but
granting Japanese participation to the fisheries which the United States
and Canada had protected and built up. A treaty should be bilateral.
A treaty which simply admits a third nation to participate to an order
maintained by the United States and Canada should not be ap-
proved.127 Before any legal action was taken however, a modus vi-
vendi was concluded between the United States and Japan on March
25, 1938; Japan agreed to cease issuing fishery licenses to boats
exploiting the Bristol Bay salmon without risking damage to her inter-
national right." Nothing in the negotiations at this time between
104 BRI'. FoR. STATE PAPERS 175 (1911); See 37 Stat. 1542, T.S. No. 564. The
parties to the treaty were Russia, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain.
-S. 3744, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
S. 2679, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
.Comment broadcasted in January, 1938.
See S. RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAw 247-49 (1942); L. LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FISHEIES 57
(1944).
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Japan and the United States would lend support to an assertion of the
abstention principle as a recognized principle of international law.
The 1945 Proclamation 29 by President Truman did not declare a
right to generally exclude third nations from fisheries in described
conservation areas. The basic underlying theory of the declaration,
however, shared a common basis with the principle of abstention:
that is, "proximity" of a coastal nation to ocean resources and "ex-
ploitation and conservation" of natural resources on large scale by a
coastal nation or by other nations were regarded as important. It was
explained that these two basic elements could justify creation of cer-
tain conservation areas wherein a nation could enforce regulatory mea-
sures regarding all fishing activities. It was also asserted that prox-
imity and conservation would even justify exclusion of newcomers in
the fishing areas. Therefore, contrary to the prevailing understanding
in Japan as to the meaning of the proviso in the declaration (i.e., a
proviso which states that the nature of "high seas" in the conserva-
tion area should be conserved), the proviso should be understood as
merely guaranteeing that the declaration is not a declaration of terri-
torial jurisdiction while rejecting the traditional principle of free access
and free competition with respect to ocean resources.3 ° The declara-
tion should be regarded as combining the idea of "conservation regula-
tions" of ocean resources on the high seas by a nation with "past
record," thus excluding fishing operations by noncoastal nations who
have no past record.
The Truman Proclamation, therefore, incorporates the principle of
"past record" which functionally would serve to exclude Japan on cer-
tain fishing activities in which she had at that time not engaged. The
unilateral expression of President Truman would have no force in
international law unless accepted by the nations concerned. In a note
of February 7, 1951, to Ambassador Dulles, Prime Minister Yoshida of
Japan accepted the United States viewpoint expressed in the Truman
Declaration as a temporary measure before the conclusion of a new
fisheries treaty. The Yoshida note stated in part: 31
59 Stat. 885-86, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945).
The Proclamation states:
The right of any State to establish conservation zones off its shores in accor-
dance with the above principles is conceded, provided that corresponding recogni-
tion is given to any fishing interests of nationals of the United States which may
exist in such areas. The character as high seas of the areas in which such
conservation zones are established and the right to their free and unimpeded
navigation are in no way thus affected.
"24 DEP'T. STATE BULL. No. 608, 351 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
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In the meantime, the Japanese Government will, as a voluntary act,
implying no waiver of their international rights, prohibit their resident
nationals and vessels from carrying on fishing operations in presently
conserved fisheries in all waters where arrangements have already been
made, either by international or domestic act, to protect the fisheries
from overharvesting, and in which fisheries Japanese nationals or vessels
were not in the year 1940 conducting operations.
Although the root of the abstention principle as a policy of the United
States can be traced back to the fur seal dispute between Britain and
the United States, no assertion of principles which support the absten-
tion argument seemed to have a basis in international law with the
possible exception of the Truman Proclamation which was at least
qualifiedly accepted by Japan through the Yoshida note. The Yoshida
note, though expressly not waiving Japan's rights under international
law, and the subsequent apparent acceptance of the abstention prin-
ciple in the Tripartite Treaty provide the only concrete precedents for
the claim that Japan accepted the abstention principle as a valid
doctrine of international law. It would appear that Japan had un-
consciously cooperated in accumulating for the United States prece-
dents favorable to the latter's position on abstention without recog-
nizing the real issues regarding the ocean resources of the North
Pacific.
In final analysis the merits of the abstention principle must be
judged in light of the new legal order embodied in the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas3 2
[hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention]. This convention is the
product of compromise between the classical doctrine of freedom of
the high seas and the necessity to conserve ocean resources. It is a
leading example of the future legal order. No nation can disregard its
existence in formulating principles which will guide it in future nego-
tiations with other nations concerning the regulation and control of
ocean resources. The most critical point to examine at this time is
whether the abstention principle advocated by the United States as a
general principle at the Conference on the Law of the Sea conforms
with the legal order established by the High Seas Convention; is the
abstention principle merely a quantitative expansion for certain special
conditions of principles embodied in the High Seas Convention?
The United States ratified the High Seas Convention on April 12,
'Adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/C.13/L.54 (1958).
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1961, but with the caveat that ratification of the treaty should not be
construed as a bar to the application of the principle of abstention.
According to the United States, failure to include the principle of
abstention as a general rule in the Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea was due merely to the lack of understanding of the depletion
problem by most delegations. Therefore, the United States, it would
seem, considers the abstention principle as not contrary to the High
Seas Convention, but, rather, implicit in the legal order created under
that treaty. It would seem that the United States understands the
concept of supremacy of a coastal state or of a state with a "past
record" in the High Seas Convention3 3 to embody the notions of "past
record" and "contiguous," in the Tripartite Treaty; hence, the former
is considered equivalent to the exception to the application of the
abstention principle in the Tripartite Treaty. If the concept of "past
record" in both of these treaties is identical, then the United States is
justified in concluding that the High Seas Convention supports the
abstention principle. Our inquiry must be focused, therefore, on the
meaning of "past record" in the High Seas Convention."
From the legal point of view, the United States understanding con-
The "past record" concept, such as it is, is dealt with in arts. 3, 4, and 5.
"Another reason that the United States and Canada introduced a proposal to
insert the abstention principle into the treaty at the Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea was to fill a gap in the draft of the International Law Commission (1956).
It was asserted that a mere guarantee of the supremacy of conservation measures
would not be enough for the conservation of particular stocks of fish. (Explanatory
material for U.S.-Canada joint proposal distributed at the Geneva Conference on
April 11, 1958. Full text is reported in 38 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. No. 983, 708 (1958).)
Still another point which should not be disregarded is the interpretation of article
2 of the High Seas Convention:
[T]he expression "conservation..." means the aggregate of the measures rendering
possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a
maximum supply of food and other marine products....
The United States asserted that, since conservation is defined in terms of total
maximum yield, a conservation program designed to secure a larger supply of food
for a particular state by decreasing total yield would not satisfy the duty imposed by
article 1(2):
All States have the duty to adopt, or to co-operate with other States in adopting,
such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conser-
vation of the living resources of the high seas.
In order to prohibit expressly such a conservation program, the United States
asserted that the abstention principle should be inserted in the Convention. See
Dean. The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52
Am. J. INT'L L. 625 (1958).
Given the United States view that fishing operations by newcomers would inevit-
ably lead to the decrease in total production of stocks of fish which have arrived at
maximum sustainable yield, the above assertion seems natural. Whether art. 1 para.
2 of the convention refers to a conservation measure designed to maintain present
production without restricting participation to or the application of the abstention
principle with respect to certain particular species of fish, seems to be the turning
point of the controversy.
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tains inherent deficiencies. Unlike the apparent United States view,
the High Seas Convention does not conceive the concepts of past
record and contiguous as overlapping; rather the convention assumes
that the two concepts are distinct but competing and need to be com-
promised. 5 The convention, assuming conflicting interests between
pelagic fishing nations and coastal states, purports to take a com-
promise position between the concepts of "past record" and "con-
tiguous." Moreover, the concept of past record in the High Seas Con-
vention does not allow for the possibility of an exclusive fishery right
by the coastal state. Without such exclusivity the convention cannot
be said as a matter of course to recognize the principle of abstention
for the conservation of certain specific stocks of fish.
Of course, the High Seas Convention does present a new conserva-
tion scheme which departs from the classical principle of free access to
the ocean fisheries. The fishery regulations of the convention are not
based on the entirely free consent of the nations concerned but are
conditioned on a binding scientifically objective standard. From the
viewpoint of the High Seas Convention, a third nation, as a general
rule, cannot be excluded from fishing operations,86 although there may
be occasions where third nations are required to show reasonable "re-
spect" toward pre-existing conservation regulations of coastal states 7
The concept of "respect for" in the High Seas Convention is much
different from the concept of "exclusion from" in the abstention prin-
ciple advocated by the United States.
The High Seas Convention does not embody the principle of absten-
tion. In fact, the convention suggests that the notion of past record
which leads to exclusivity is not an acceptable concept in international
law. The proper concept of past record as embodied in the convention
=The convention purports to take a compromise position with provisions based
on "past record" in arts. 3, 4, and 5, and provisions relating to the interests of coastal
nations in arts. 6 and 7.
'The High Seas Convention deals with the concept of "past record" resulting
from execution of no exclusive rights of fishery. The so-called "historic title"
concept was not dealt with. Therefore, the instances where "abstention" can be
applied to nations with no "past record" would be rare; e.g., where all the nations
concerned are equally obliged to abstain when the necessity of conservation is
scientifically proved, or the case where the quota for each nation becomes practically
zero as a consequence of scientific application of the data collected for the purpose
of conservation. It should be noted that these illustrations are theoretically different
from an unconditional general denial of access to fisheries by a third nation. There
may be, of course, an exceptional case where a third nation may not engage in fishing
operations because the coastal nation has already engaged in a conservation program
within her territorial sea. Operation in the adjacent high seas would also be
prohibited.
See art. 1(1) (b) and generally art. 6.
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directs that the past record of a coastal state be shown respect by
noncoastal fishermen. Past record, however, does not automatically
exclude noncoastal fishermen without past records from fishing stocks
on the high seas. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the absten-
tion principle has not been accepted as a general doctrine of interna-
tional law.
III. CONCLUSION
In the traditional theory of international law of the seas, historic
title was used to justify exclusive use of areas of the high seas when
such use would have been otherwise prohibited. Coastal nations at-
tempted to expand their territorial seas and hence their monopolized
area of fisheries relying on historic titles. On the other hand, non-
coastal nations engaged in fisheries as a matter of nonexclusive right
regardless of their historic titles (i.e., "past records").
As we have seen, under the abstention principle, whether or not
nonexclusive rights to participate in high sea fisheries will be recog-
nized for those noncoastal nations is likely to depend upon the will of
coastal nations which have engaged in a conservation program. When
we carefully examined the historical development of ocean fisheries
right, we saw that such a principle has not been generalized as yet, for
the High Seas Convention did not allow an exclusion of operations by
noncoastal nations or no-past-record nations. Thus, the problem faced
by the three nations of the Tripartite Treaty is to propose a revision
of that treaty which would draw a rational line between it and the
High Seas Convention and to settle objectively the relationship of the
abstention principle to the evolving international law of the seas.
In regulating and deciding the legal status of fishing boats on the
high seas and resolving resulting conflicts, the concept of "territorial
jurisdiction" is still very important. But this concept can neither
regulate operational aspects of fisheries as an industry or as an enter-
prise, nor formulate a scheme of allocation of sea resources among
nations. When we realize the importance of ocean resources as a
source of food supply to the world, we should idealistically also regard
ocean fisheries as an international common enterprise functioning un-
der an international nonterritorial jurisdiction. The denial of an ex-
pansion for national appropriation should be the minimum require-
ment for an exploitation and allocation of ocean resources. Although
maximum sustained yield can be an excellent standard to decide total
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fishing ceilings or fishing frequency, it can never decide a proper
method of allocation nor can it be used as a basis for excluding third
nations from fisheries. However earnestly conservation or the neces-
sity of protecting ocean resources may be advocated, it would be
nothing but an assertion for appropriation of certain stocks of fish to
certain nations so long as "past record" of a conservation program by
a coastal nation and "abstention" by third nations are regarded paral-
lel. Such an abstention idea may be criticized as still determining
fisheries rights from a territorial jurisdictional point of view.

